The Return of the Prodigal Son, 1670 by Bartolome Esteban Murillo
The nature of evil, truth, deception, and divine grace are assessed by Saint Augustine of Hippo in his Enchiridion on Faith, Hope, and Love. “All beings were made good,” he writes, “but not being perfectly good are liable to corruption.” As “the absence of good,” evil arises by our falling away, wittingly or otherwise, from the order of things; thus, error within the order is qualified as evil in itself – though not necessarily a sin.1
Augustine contends that “we cannot err except in ignorance” given that to transgress the order knowingly would render it not just an absence of good, i.e., evil, but an active subversion of truth – a lie.2 As we are limited in our knowledge of the order of things, error or evil is inevitable. Forgiveness of error that inevitably results from such ignorance is here understood as a grace of God. Intentional error, lying, or speaking contra one's conception of truth, be it true or not, is sinful; the deception remains such irrespective of its bearing on the reality, given that to measure the moral quality of an utterance – informed by fleeting glimpses of Truth – solely by its in-the-round veracity would render us all egregious liars.
So, one is not permitted to employ sinful means, e.g., lies, to pious ends. To deceive for a seemingly just cause would be to sacrifice the spirit of truth for good, of which we have an infinitesimal awareness. Augustine concludes, “there cannot be any doubt, that the only cause of any good that we enjoy is the goodness of God.”3 Moreover, “no man cometh unto the Father, but by me,” says Truth of reaching the Good.4
Augustine. “Enchiridion on Faith, Hope, and Love,” in Ethics: History, Theory, and Contemporary Issues. ed. Steven M. Cahn and Peter J. Markie. OUP, 2020, 216-217, 219.
Ibid., 218.
Ibid., 222.
John 14:6 (KJV).